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EXPENSES INCURRED IN SEEKING
EMPLOYMENT-THE TAX COURT OPENS THE
DOOR TO DEDUCTIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
This note presents an analysis of recent Tax Court decisions
concerning expenses incurred in seeking employment. These expenses
have typically consisted of travel, resume, legal, advertising, cover letters
and telephone answering service costs. 1 Individual taxpayers attempting
to deduct these costs have relied upon § 162 and § 212 (or their
predecessors) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 2 Previous Tax Court
and Service treatment of these expenses has caused taxpayers and
commentators difficulty for over fifty years.3 Although the Service has
taken the official position that such costs are not deductible,4 an analysis
of past litigation and Service rulings reveals conflicting rationales in
support of this position. This conflict has been obscured by various
attempts to distinguish expenses of seeking employment from those of
securing employment.5 An historical narrative will demonstrate that,
1. E.g., Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927) (travel expenses); Leon Chooluck, 23 P-H Tax Ct.
811 (1954) (travel expenses); Raymond L. Collier, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 804 (1954) (travel resum6,
employment fees); Albert A. Loden, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1956) (travel expenses); Thomas
W. Ryan, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959) (legal, advertising and employment agency fees);
Francois Louis, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1966) (employment agency fees and telephone
answering service fees); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969) (employment agency fees); Morris v.
Comm., 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970) (employment agency fees).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162: TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES. "(a) In General.-There shall
be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212:
EXPENSES FOR PRODUCTION OF INCOME. "In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production
of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection or refund of any tax."
3. See Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, 11 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1147, i 166-67
(1953); Fleisher, IRS About-face on Employment Fees Shows Shaky Basis for Taxing Similar
Items, 13 J. TAX. 82 (1960); Nahstall, Non-Trade and Non-Business Expense Deduction, 46 MICH.
L. REV. 10 15, 1028 n. 51 (1948). Another area of tax law related to this subject which has received
similar treatment is investigation costs, see Note, Investigation Cost: An Analysis and a Proposal,
41 TEMP. L.Q. 81 (1967); Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigating for a
Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REv. 567 (1959).
4. I.T. 1397, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 145 (1922).
5. Thomas W. Ryan. 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969);
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although the Service maintained the position that expenses incurred in
seeking employment were personal, the Tax Court relied on the absence
of a trade or business in denying the deduction. Because of the limited
definition afforded "trade or business", however, these conflicting
rationales achieved the same result. Recently the Tax Court has adopted
a much more liberal view as to what constitutes a trade or business and
in so doing has placed these conflicting rationales in juxtaposition. The
result of this conflict will be analyzed in relation to pertinent code
sections and applied to hypothetical fact patterns for an insight into
future significance.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Service's first official statement on employment costs was an
Office Decision published in 1920: "Fees paid to secure employment are
considered allowable deductions for the purpose of computing net
income subject to tax." (Emphasis added)' This decision was followed
two years later by a ruling on travel expenses incurred in seeking
employment: "Amounts expended by a taxpayer in seeking a position
are held to be personal expenses and are not deductible from gross
income." (Emphasis added)7
These two decisions established a distinction between "seeking" and
'securing" employment; a distinction which was subsequently blurred
by the decision in Mort L. Bixler.s
In Bixier, the petitioner organized and managed state fairs which
required traveling to various states to secure contracts for his services. In
denying the deductibility of expenses incurred in these travels, the court
equated securing with seeking when it stated:
When he was not so employed he was carrying on no trade or business
... A considerable portion of the expenses claimed were incurred by
the petitioner securing employment. . . and we think amounts expended
in seeking employment. . . are not deductible. (Emphasis added),
Later cases followed the Bixier rationale in denying similar attempts
to deduct expenses for seeking employment. In Leon Chooluck the
petitioner worked in various independent motion picture productions. l
David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380-82 (1970) (Commissioner's argument and J. Tannerwald's
concurring opinion). See discussion of Francois Louis, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1966) p. 474
infra.
6. O.D. 579, 3 CUM. BULL. 130 (1920).
7. I.T. 1397, 1-2Cum. BULL. 145 (1922).
8. 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
9. Id. at 1184.
10. 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1954).
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He attempted to deduct the travel expenses incurred in seeking
employment. The Tax Court, denying the deduction, responded as in
Bixler that there was no evidence that the petitioner was employed as an
independent contractor and he was not, therefore, carrying on a trade or
business."
Although the code allowed deductions for travel expenses incurred in
pursuit of a trade or business, 2 the Tax Court in Chooluck drew a
distinction between seeking employment and pursuing a trade or
business, citing the case of Morton L. Frank.3 In Frank, although
expenses incurred in seeking employment were not at issue, the Tax
Court defined the term "in pursuit of a trade or business" by saying:
"'pursuit' . . . is not used in the sense of 'searching for' or 'following
after', but in the sense of 'in connection with' or 'in the course of' a trade
or business. It [pursuit] presupposes an existing business .... " 1
In Raymond L. Collier (again using Frank), the Tax Court disallowed
expenses incurred by an unemployed executive.' 5 In Collier, the
petitioner lost his job because of illness and retained an employment
agency to obtain a new position. In disallowing the deduction, the Tax
Court stated: "[p]etitioner was carrying on'no trade or business when
the expenditures were made. . . [h]e was seeking employment.""
The following year the Tax Court was confronted in William Galindos
with an ingenuious argument to the same question. 7 The petitioner had
been employed five months in 1952 and four months in 1953.
Attempting to deduct expenses incurred in seeking employment, he
argued that because he was over 35 he had more difficulty obtaining
employment than younger men equally qualified. Consequently, the
expenses he incurred should be considered differently from those
expenses incurred by a person who can readily obtain employment. The
Tax Court, concluding the petitioner's age to be immaterial, stated that
11. Id. at 812.
12. IrT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a)(2).
13. 20T.C. 511 (1953).
14. Id. at 513-14. In Frank the petitioner, following his discharge from the service, worked as an
employee of a newspaper. He traveled extensively investigating several publishing businesses he was
interested in acquiring. The court denied his deductions for travel expenses under § 23 of the 1939
Code (the predecessor of § 162) by using the reasoning stated in the text. The court denied a similar
attempt by a petitioner to deduct travel expenses incurred to secure employment in Albert A. Loden,
25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1956) and Tenney v. Osburn, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 267 (1958).
15. 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 804 (1954).
16. Id. at 805.
17. 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 252 (1955).
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the expenses were incurred while unemployed and incident to seeking
employment and hence (citing Frank) not deductible. 18
The distinction between seeking and securing employment was revived
in Thomas v. Ryan." The petitioner was employed from 1944-1953 by
Basic Refractories. In 1953 he resigned and obtained employment with
Alton Brick. In obtaining employment with Alton Brick, the petitioner
paid a law firm $600 for services and advertising and a $250 retaining fee
to an employment firm. A condition in the employment firm contract
required the final fee to be paid only if he accepted new employment as a
result of the firm's endeavors. Attempting to deduct his expenses under
O.D. 579, he argued that the Tax Court should not distinguish between
amounts paid to regular employment agencies and amounts paid to
others who perform the same function. The Tax Court, failing to
specifically answer the claim under O.D. 579, stated there was no
evidence that the employment firm obtained a new position for the
petitioner. Moreover, the Tax Court, citing Frank, argued that it was
well established that expenses incurred while seeking employment were
non-deductible. The Tax Court closed saying, ". . . whether any such
distinction [between seeking and securing] would be valid, we find it
unnecessary here to decide."'"
With the question of "'seeking" as opposed to "securing" once again
revived, the Service issued a ruling in 1960 which reaffirmed its initial
position. 21 The Service stated that expenses incurred in seeking a position
were personal and not deductible and that O.D.579 (allowing deductions
for fees paid to secure employment) was revoked. 22 Explaining its
position, the Service stated that although employment agency fees are
generally paid after employment has been secured, the obligation to pay
such fees is incurred when the individual is seeking employment.
Therefore, it held: ". . . expenditures incurred by an individual in
seeking employment, including fees paid to an employment agency, are
not allowable deductions for Federal income tax purposes."' '
The Service seemed to reiterate that although previous cases had held
expenses of seeking employment non-deductible because of the non-
18. Id. at 253.
19. 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959).
20. Id. at 509. The court found no evidence that the final placement fee was paid and from this
concluded the fees were paid for seeking rather than securing employment.
21. Rev. Rul. 158, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 140.
22. Id. at 141.
23. Id. This seemed to be an attempt to undercut the rationale that since the fees were paid after
the new employment commenced, they were paid in an existing trade or business.
Vol. 1970: 468]
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existence of a trade or business (for § 162 purposes) or of an existing
interest (for § 212 purposes), the official position was that these
expenses, regardless of their relationship to the existing trade or
business, were personal and therefore non-deductible.
This statement by the Commissioner should have settled the question
the Ryan court found unnecessary to decide.2Y But six weeks later the
Service, reacting to the outcry from taxpayers,2 revoked the above
ruling and issued Revenue Ruling 60-223 which held:
Revenue Ruling 60-158. . . which holds that expenses incurred in seeking
employment, including fees paid to an employment agency, are not
deductible . . . is revoked . . . The Internal Revenue Service will
continue to allow deductions for fees paid to employment agencies for
securing employment.2'
The effect of this ruling was to reinstate: (1) O.D. 579 (which allowed
any fees paid to secure employment to be deducted)2 and (2) the Tax
Court's rationale that since fees were paid after employment was secured
they were "paid or incurred in a trade or business". An implicit
consequence of this decision is that, if an existing trade or business can
be found, the personal nature of the expense will not render it -non-
deductible. This result conflicts with the premise that § 262 [personal
expenses] is in fact a limiter on § 162 and § 212, but is borne out by
court treatment of cases folloving the issuance of Revenue Ruling 60-
223.21
24. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
25. 4 TAX COORDINATOR (R.I.A.) § L, 4102 (1967).
26. Rev. Rul. 223, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 57.
27. T.I.R. 231; INDEX CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 7386. Cf. Carus9 v. United States,
236 F. Supp. 88,91 n.4 (D. N.J. 1964).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 Personal, living, and family expenses-
(a) In General In computing taxable income, no deduction shall be allowed, except as
otherwise expressly provided in Chapter I of the Code, for personal, living, and family
expenses.
(c) Cross references.
Certain items of a personal, living, or family nature are deductible to the extent expressly
provided under the following sections, and the regulations under those sections:
(1) Section 163 (interests)
(2) Section 164 (taxes)
(3) Section 165 (losses)
(4) Section 166 (bad debts)
(5) Section 170 (charitable, etc., contributions and gifts)
(6) Section 213 (medical, dental, etc., expenses)
(7) Section 214 (expenses for care of certain dependents)
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In Riddle v. United States, the petitioner was an engineer employed by
the Air Force.2' During this employment he was approached by a
representative of an engineering firm to do consulting work on a part-
time basis. The petitioner accepted the offer, set up an office in his home
and later unsuccessfully looked for more consulting work. The district
court, upholding his attempt to deduct travel expenses and 12% of his
home maintenance expenses, found the petitioner was in the trade or
business of being a consulting engineer and, therefore, the expenses were
deductible. 30
Two years later, another district court reacted similarly in Caruso v.
United States.31 In Caruso, the petitioner, a veteran, passed the Civil
Service Examination for Assistant Building Inspector, which for all
practical purposes guaranteed his appointment. Prior to appointment,
however, his name was removed from the register. In an effort to be
reinstated, petitioner retained an attorney and through the attorney's
efforts the petitioner's name was subsequently placed back on the
register, resulting in his appointment to the position. The district court,
upholding the petitioner's deductions of attorney's fees, held that,
although the petitioner had no job, he had a status and "[t]he federal
government is willing to encourage any expenses necessary to maintain
an existing income-producing activity. It does not, however, intend to
allow deductions for every potential income producing activity. In the
first case, the government is in effect looking after its own income
interest; in the latter, it would be absorbing the costs of mere
speculation." 32 In reaching this result the court agreed with the Service
rulings concerning seeking employment, but found that in this case
petitioner already had an interest to protect.3
(8) Section 215 (alimony, etc., payments)
(9) Section 216 (amounts representing taxes and interest paid to cooperative housing
corporation)
(10) Section 217 (moving expenses).
29. 205 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1962).
30. Note the importance of the expenses having been incurred after his being approached by a
third party. Since he had already done some consulting work, the court could easily find he was
established in the trade or business of being a consulting engineer. If, however, the same expenses
had been incurred without his having been approached by a third party, the result would have been
different.
31. 236 F. Supp. 88 (D. N.J. 1964).
32 Id. at 92.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1-212-1 (f) (1957) ("expenses incurred in seeking employment are non-
deductible under § 212"). It is important to note in this case, however, that there was also a strong
governmental policy involved which may have affected the decision. The court stated that to assure
Vol. 1970: 468]
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Francois Louis, two years later, provides a vivid example of the
potential inconsistencies produced by the varying rationales used by the
Service and the courts.3 The petitioner, an engineer, was unemployed
from October 1961 to March of 1962. In February of 1962 he entered
info a service contract with National Executive Search Inc., an
employment agency, paying an initial fee of $450 and agreeing to later
pay National Executive 10% of his first year's salary if they secured a
position for him. The petitioner also subscribed to a telephone answering
service to receive calls from prospective employers to whom he had sent
resumes. He obtained employment in March of 1962 through his
individual efforts and attempted to deduct the fee paid to the
employment agency and other costs, including the cost of the telephone
answering service.
The Tax Court, in denying the deduction, held:
1. It was well established that expenses of seeking employment were
non-deductible (citing Frank) and since there vas no evidence of his
being in business for himself as a professional engineer the deductions
were not allowable under § 162;
2. The deductions were not allowable under § 212 for the same
reasons set down in Ryan; and
3. The expenses were not allowable under Revenue Ruling 60-223
because the employment agency did not get the petitioner his job, once
again saying it was unnecessary to consider the correctness of the
distinction between seeking and securing.
Thus, the Tax Court not only refused to allow deductions for fees paid
to an employment agency for seeking employment, but also denied fees
paid to the telephone answering service for securing employment, since
not paid to an employment agency.3
In Eugene A. Carter, the Tax Court three years later reiterated the
distinction between "seeking" and "securing". 31 The petitioner, an Air
Force officer, deducted fees paid to an employment agency even though
he obtained his new employment ultimately as a result of his own efforts.
effectuation of a strong policy in favor of Civil Service, Caruso's primary eligibility must be
considered near-equivalent of actual employment. To rule otherwise would defeat strong policies
concerning Civil Service. 236 F. Supp. at 92-93.
34. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174 (1966).
35. Note that O.D. 579, note 5 supra, which was reinstated by Rev. Rul. 60-223 does not mention
the necessity of the fees being paid to an employment agency.
36. 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
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The Tax Court, in denying his deduction, said Revenue Ruling 60-223
allowed fees paid for securing not seeking employment. The distinction
can be justified by applying the expenses to the new employment
therefore making them incident to a trade or business. 37
This perfunctory test was adopted a year later by the ninth circuit in
affirming the 1967 Tax Court opinion in Carson J. Morris.38 Petitioner,
a vice president of an advertising firm, contracted with an employment
firm to secure new employment on a non-contingent fee basis. He
subsequently obtained employment with a Packing Company through
his own efforts, and attempted to deduct the fees paid to the employment
firm. The court of appeals, in rejecting the petitioner's argument, 31 stated
the distinction to be between expenses in seeking and preparing for new
work and securing and performing such work.40
With this case the judicial position seemed to revert to the original
distinction established fifty years earlier in O.D. 579 and I.T. 1397.41
From the original ruling that expenses incurred in seeking employment
were personal and therefore non-deductible, 42 there developed a line of
cases denying the deductions because the expenses were not incident to
any existing trade or business or any existing interest. This was followed
by the Service's attempt to reestablish its original position in Revenue
Ruling 60-158 only to withdraw it in Revenue Ruling 60-223. What has
followed has been a return to the existing trade or business investigation
and ultimately an automatic application of the "securing" as opposed to
"seeking" test.
It is within this framework that we look at the Tax Court's treatment
of DavidJ. Primuth.43
37 Id. at 935.
38 Morris v. Comm., 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970), affg Carson J. Morris, 36 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem 1424 (1967).
39 "It is axiomatic that without gainful employment it is usually impossible to legally at least
produce or collect income. If, as in the petitioner's case, there are expenses incurred in seeking that
employment surely that expense qualifies as 'necessary' both within the letter and the spirit of the
law " Id at 612 (quoting from petitioner's brief).
40. It is interesting to note that the tax court's opinion which applied the "secure" or "seek" test
was written (and unreviewed) by a judge who had retired in 1955 and had been recalled to perform
judicial duties under § 7447 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Although the judge was very
emincnt, it is possible his view may not have been in keeping with the present court's position. This
is especially true since two new members have been added to the court since then and one of these
new members wrote the majority opinion in the leading case which liberalized the court's position,
David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
41. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
42. See note 7 supra.
43. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
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In Primuth, the petitioner was employed by Foundry Allied Industries
as Secretary-Treasurer with responsibility for the financial well being of
the corporation, as well as overall management responsibility for cost
accounting, purchasing and international finance. Petitioner became
dissatisfied with his prospects for advancement, and in response to an
advertisement in the Wall Street Journal contacted Fredrick Chusid Co.
for the sole purpose of securing new employment. Chusid, although not
licensed as an employment agency in its home state of Illinois, described
itself as the "world's largest Consultants in Executive Search and Career
Advancement."
The petitioner was contacted by a Chusid representative and signed a
contract under which he agreed to pay, irrespective of whether new
employment was obtained, $2,775 or $2,636 if the fee was paid within
three weeks, plus certain out-of-pocket expenses in return for Chusid's
services. Chusid agreed to provide "consulting service and direct
assistance" for a period of 8 months.
As a result of Chusid's efforts, petitioner interviewed with at least
seven representatives of various companies and these interviews resulted
in four offers of employment. One of the offers was from Symon
Manufacturing Co. with which the petitioner accepted employment as
Secretary-Controller three days after he terminated his previous
employment.
Petitioner deducted both the fee paid to Chusid and the out-of-pocket
expenses as an "Employment Agency Fee" on his federal income tax
return for the taxable year ending December 31, 1966. The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed the deduction stating:
The fee of $3,016.43 paid to Fredrick Chusid Company is determined to
be an expenditure for the purpose of seeking employment which is not
deductible under Section 162 or Section 212 of the Internal Revenue
Code, but constitutes a non-deductible personal expense under Section
262."
The Commissioner argued that the fees paid to Chusid were not
deductible on two grounds:
1. Chusid was not an employment agency registered under Illinois
law, 4 and
44. Id. at 377.
45. Although the Commissioner's argument seems irrelevant and was so treated by the Court,
there is a policy reason which supports the Commissioner's position. Chusid's home office is in
Chicago, Illinois. The Illinois statute governing employment agencies contains specific provisions
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. The fee was not contingent upon the securing of a position.
Consequently the fee was for seeking rather than securing employment."
The Tax Court held that the expenditures incurred by the petitioner in
securing new employment were deductible under § 162 of the Internal
which regulate the fees and activities of such organizations. Since Chusid had refused to register, the
Commissioner was in effect arguing that an allowance of the deduction would sanction Chusid's
avoidance of state law.
The statutes provide [ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 197a-197o. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970)1:
Section 197a.
197a Licenses- Fees-Application-Schedule of fees and charges.
* * * No person shall open, keep or carry on any employment agency in the State of
Illinois, unless such person shall procure a license therefore from the Department of Labor.
Section 197d.
197d. Employment counsellors-licensing. It shall be unlawful for any person to act as an
employment counsellor, or to advertise, or assume to act as an employment counsellor,
without first obtaining a license as such employment counsellor, from the Department of
Labor.* * *
Section 197e.
197e. Registration fees and other special fees-Sending applicants when position not open-
Recipts-Refunds-Referral slips-Disputes-Posting law-Monthly statements.] §5.
* * * When a permit is granted, such licensed person may charge a registration fee not to
exceed two dollars. * * *
No such licensee shall, as a condition to registering or obtaining employment for such
applicant, require such applicant to subscribe to any publication or to any postal card
service, or advertisement, or exact any other fees, compensation or reward, (except that in
the case of applicants for positions paying salaries of 5000 dollars or more per annum, where
the agency has secured from the Department of Labor a permit to furnish a letter service in
accordance with regulations of the department governing the furnishing of such service, a
special fee not to exceed 100 dollars, to be credited on the fee charged for any placement
resulting from such letter service, may be changed for furnishing such letter service) other
than the aforesaid registration fee and a further fee, called a placement fee, the amount of
which shall be agreed upon between such applicant and such licensee to be payable at such
time as may be agreed upon in writing; but the placement fee aforesaid shall not be received
by such licensee before the applicant has been tendered a position by such licensee. In the
event the posttion so tendered is not accepted by or given to such applicant, said licensee shall
refund all fees paid other than the registration fee and special fee aforesaid, within 3 days of
demand therefor. * * * (Emphasis added)
Section 197k.
197k. Terms defined. When used in this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:
The term 'employment agency' means any person engaged for gain or profit in the business
of securing or attempting to secure employment for persons seeking employment or
employees for employers. * * *
46. The Illinois statute, id., places a one hundred dollar limit on the registration fee and requires
that the payment of all other fees be contingent upon the agency's placement of the individual.
Again the Commissioner's argument seems directed at Chusid's refusal to comply with Illinois law.
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Revenue Code because the expenses were "incurred by the petitioner in
carrying on his trade or business of being a corporate executive. '4
In reaching. this result the majority of the Tax Court cited previous
cases which held that a taxpayefr may be in the trade or business of being
an employee and since the petitioner in this case was engaged in the trade
or business of being a corporate executive, the court argued that "[I]t is
difficult to think of a purer business expense than one incurred to permit
such an individual to continue to carry on that very trade or
business-albeit with a different corporate employer."48 Nor, the court
argued, were the expenses personal, because no position requiring greater
or different qualifications was required and the expenditure did not result
in the acquisition of an asset.
Moreover, the court stated the decision in Primuth to be consistent
with the position taken by the Commissioner in Revenue Ruling 60-223
(allowing fees paid to employment agencies for securing employment).
The court responded to the Commissioner's arguments by stating that
whether Chusid might be classified as an employment agency was
unimportant; important, the court indicated, was "that Chusid did all
that any third party can do to secure employment for the
petitioner. . .. -4" The court thus adopted the position of the taxpayer
in Ryan.50 And, even though the fee was payable in all events, they
regarded the distinction as unimportant if employment actually results.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Tannewald expressed his full
agreement with the result reached by the majority, on the grounds that
drawing distinctions "based upon the difference between 'seeking' and
'securing' employment, upon whether the fee of the employment agency
is contingent or payable in any event, or upon whether the agency's
efforts are successful or unsuccessful simply adds unnecessary confusion
and complexity to a tax law which already defies understanding even by
the sophisticated taxpayer." 5' 1 In these cases he would adopt a simple test
based on a comparision of the position occupied by the petitioner before
and after the acquisition of the new employment. If the position occupied
after the change is comparable to that occupied before the change then
the expenses are deductible. For purposes of this comparison, he would
have narrowed the majority's categorization of the petitioner's position
from a corporate executive to a financial corporate executive.52
47. David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. at 377.
48. Id. at 379.
49. Id. at 380.
50. 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959).
51. 54 T.C. at 381.
52. Id. at 382.
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In other separate opinions, Judge Simpson concurred on the grounds
that no legal basis had been established for denying a deduction for the
expenses of seeking a new position in the same trade or business; Judge
Featherton concurred solely on the grounds that the petitioner's
activities fully met the requirement of Revenue Ruling 60-223.5
Judge Tietjens, with five other judges concurring, dissented arguing
that the expenses incurred by the petitioner were the same as
investigation expenses in locating or finding a new business and therefore
not deductible.5
The Tax Court, in subsequent opinions, has expanded the holding of
Primuth. In Guy R. Motto, the court extended the holding of Primuth to
allow the deduction of expenses incurred by a petitioner who, as result of
Chusid's efforts, obtained new employment as a section head of the
mechanical division of Guepel Architects and Engineers. Prior to
enlisting the services of Chusid (under terms similar to those in Primuth)
the petitioner became dissatisfied with his existing employment because
he felt his employer was not making full use of his potential and because
he desired a position which would yield a greater income coupled with a
more challenging and responsible career.
The Tax Court, in reversing the Commissioner's determination of a
deficiency, held that the expenses were deductible under Section 162 of
the Internal Revenue Code, because they were incurred by the petitioner
in carrying on his trade or business of being an engineer. In reaching this
result, the court stated that "[tlhis case is indistinguishable from our
recent court-reviewed opinion in David J. Primuth."6 The court argued
that the sole difference between the cases was that in Primuth the
petitioner was a corporate executive, whereas in Motto the petitioner was
an engineer.
In Kenneth R. Kenfield,5 7 the Tax Court was again confronted with
the question of the deduction of fees paid to Chusid. Petitioner was a
design engineer with General Electric, and became dissatisfied with his
"prospects" and wished to increase his salary. Petitioner engaged
Chusid in order to secure another job as a design engineer. As a result of
Chusid's efforts, the petitioner received a firm job offer at an increased
salary from American Steel Foundries, Inc.. Kenfield accepted the offer
53 Id at 384.
54 Id.
55 54 T.C. 558 (1970).
56 Id. at 559.
57 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
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but two days prior to his departure from General Electric, General
Electric offered him a salary increase similar to that offered by
American and a promotion to manager of the "Fuel and Ignition
Systems Development" group. Petitioner accepted General Electric's
offer. General Electric was not aware of Chusid's efforts in the
petitioner's behalf or of American's offer. General Electric made its
offer solely on the basis of the knowledge that the petitioner intended to
leave and on discussions with him.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction of the fee paid to Chusid
because the expenses of seeking employment constitute personal
expenses which are specifically non-deductible under section 262 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 58
The court, in an unreviewed opinion, held the petitioner's payment to
Chusid in connection with his search for a new job was deductible under
section 162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In reaching this
result, the court reasoned that since the petitioner was in the trade or
business of being an engineer both before and after engaging the service
of Chusid, the case fell within the rule announced in Primuth59 and
Motto60 and therefore the expenses were proximately related to the
petitioner's trade or business as an engineer. The Commissioner's
argument, that the case was distinguishable from Primuth and Motto
because the petitioner did not obtain new employment, was rejected by
the court because petitioner had in fact obtained a job with a new
employer through Chusid's efforts which he chose not to accept.
Moreover, General Electric's new offer was in part due to Chusid's
efforts.61
The rationale laid down in Primuth was further extended in W.
Richard Gerhard.62 Gerhard was employed as general manager of
Automatic Lathe Cutterhead Company. Prior to his termination with
Automatic, the petitioner retained an employment agency and expended
personal efforts in his search for new employment. As a result of his
personal efforts he obtained a position as controller for Helgensen
Harvestore Inc. Petitioner deducted the fee paid to the employment
agency and his out-of-pocket expenses from his 1967 return. The
58. Id. at 1199.
59. 54.T.C. 374 (1970).
60. 54 T.C. 558 (1970).
61. 54T.C.at 1200.
62. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-262.
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Commissioner allowed the deduction of fees paid to the employment
agency, but assessed a deficiency for the out-of-pocket expenses.6
The Tax Court, in a memorandum opinion, held that the expenses
were deductible under the doctrine set forth in Primuth. Moreover, the
court in reaching this result rejected the Commissioner's attempt to
distinguish the case from Primuth on the grounds that the petitioner had
entered a new business."
With this case, the Tax Court seemed to adopt the position specifically
rejected four years earlier in Francois Louis and to open the door for any
expenses incurred in seeking employment. The government also has
changed its position in light of recent cases. After originally filing an
appeal to Primuth the Justice Department withdrew it. The Service also
is re-evaluating Revenue Ruling 60-223 in light of the Primuth decision
and will issue a new revenue ruling to cover the subject.
Although the position the Service will take is not known, it will
probably be similar to the position taken by the Solicitor General in
withdrawing the government appeal to Primuth. The Solicitor General
took the position that any fees paid to an employment agency or firm are
deductible so long as the taxpayer obtains employment.65
Although this will clarify some of the uncertainties under Revenue
Ruling 60-223, it still leaves unanswered individual expenses incurred by
the taxpayer in obtaining employment. Even though the new revenue
ruling may provide a more liberal position, the tax court's allowance of
individual expenses incurred by the taxpayer in Gerhard indicates a
willingness to extend the concept further. 66
III. ANALYSIS
The importance of Primuth seems to lie in the liberal definition
afforded trade or business and in the court's attempt to quash the
63. The facts related in the text are not contained in the Court's opinion. For source material see
Telephone Interview with U.S. Government Tax Counsel, Nov. 18, 1970, on file Washington
University Law Quarterly.
64. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-262.
65 Telephone Interview with U.S. Government Tax Counsel, Nov. 18, 1970, on File Washington
University Law Quarterly.
66 It should be noted that this is a Memorandum Decision when considering its authoritative
value. In another recent case, Gale C. Huber, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-219, the court again allowed
the deduction of individual expenses incurred in obtaining a taxpayer a new position after originally
contacting Chusid. Although the court stated that the "deductions cannot require that the
employment service procure the new employment single handedly", it did find Chusid was some
assistance to the taxpayer and on this ground distinguished its holding from Morris v. Comm. supra
note 38.
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distinction between seeking and securing employment. Prior to Primuth
the courts had taken a restrictive view as to the existence of a trade or
business. Seeking employment presupposed the non-existence of a trade
or business and, hence, the courts found little difficulty in denying the
deductibility of expenses incurred in such activity. Faced with the
Commissioner's allowance of fees paid to secure employment, however,
the courts formulated the rationale that such expenses were incident to
the taxpayers new trade or business and, therefore, deductible.
What followed were attempts by taxpayers to attach the "securing"
label to these expenses, thereby allowing them to come under the cover of
a trade or business. In response, the Commissioner found it necessary to
formulate hollow arguments to distinguish seeking from securing-as
exemplified by his position on contingent and noncontingent fees paid to
employment agencies set forth in Primuth. This already complex
question, therefore, became subjected to a nonsensical play on words.
Primuth and subsequent cases attempted to end this inanity but they
also did more. By liberalizing the scope of inquiry into what may
constitute a trade or business, the court made possible the deductibility
of previously unallowable expenses and undercut the Service's
contention that expenses incurred in seeking employment were not
deductible.
A. Section 162
Section 162 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . .. ""
With this apparent statutory support for an "existing trade or
business" it becomes necessary to investigate the scope of the term.6"
Although the term "trade or business" appears 170 times in 60 code
sections and has never been defined in a revenue act,69 the term business
was defined early by the Service as:
That which occupies and engages the time, attention and labor of anyone
for the purpose of livelihood, profit or improvement; that which is his
67. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
68. See Groh, "Trade or Business". What It Means, What it is and What it is not, 26 J. TAX. 78
(1967). 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.08 (J. Malone ed. 1968). I J.
RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 3.02(1) (1970).
69. Groh, "Trade or'Business". What it Means, What it is and What it is not, 26 J. TAX. 78, 80
(1967).
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personal concern or interest, employment, regular occupation, but it is not
necessary that it should be his sole occupation or employment. 7'
Although this definition was later narrowed71 it has been consistently
held that an employee is in the trade or business of selling his services. 72
The scope of the inquiry narrows, therefore, to determining whether or
not he loses this status if unemployed or changes employers.
As has been discussed earlier, the cases denying deductions for
expenses incurred in seeking employment have reasoned that seeking
employment implies no existing trade or business or economic interest.
This narrow view is inconsistent with both case law and Service position.
As explained in Daily Journal Co. v. Commissioner, "[iut would be an
absurdity to hold that one person with long established skills in
management is not engaged in managerial business, if by agreement he
supplies that skill to another." 3
This was later reiterated by the Service when it stated:
It would be most unrealistic, regardless of the proper treatment in other
cases, to treat a wage earner whose livelihood is regularly gained from a
series of relatively short employments for various employers as having no
trade or business during intervals between such employment. (Emphasis
added)
and:
The Service, therefore, will continue to treat a wage earner whose
livelihood consists of a series of relatively short employments for various
employers as having a trade or business of his own, providing, of course,
70. Messamer, What Constitutes a Trade or Business Under Federal Income Tax Laws, 3 KAN.
L REv. 98, 106 (1954), citing: T.D. 1983, 16 TREAS. DEc. INr. REV. 84 (1914).
71. Higgins v. Comm., 312 U.S. 212 (194 1) (More limited than concept of actively engaged in for
profit). Also Charles H. Schafer 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1964); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 196 ); Rev. Rul. 5, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 322 (not only profit but extensive activity
over a substantial period of time during which the taxpayer holds himself out as selling goods or
services); 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 25.08 at 29 (J. Malone ed.
1%8).
72. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter
- . holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services"); Harold A.
Christensen, 17 T.C. 1456 (1952); Benjamin Abraham, 9 T.C. 222 (1947); Ralph C. Holmes, 37
B.T A. 865 (1938); Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 21 B.T.A. 588 (1930), affd. 60 F.2d 187 (3rd.
Cir 1932); Mitchell v. United States, 408 F.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also Dobris, Employee's
Expenses in Earning Salary, 20 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 119, 120 (1962); Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 60; I.T. 4012, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 33; Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 303, 305;
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(d), -5(a) & (d).
73 135 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943) (attempts by taxpayer to deduct salary as president). See
also Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2, 6 (1962); Furner v. Comm., 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); cf. Ditmars
v. Comm., 302 F.2d481 (2d Cir. 1962).
Vol. 1970: 4681
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/4
484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that the facts in the particular case show a real and substantial business
justification for engaging in the several employments, such as the
necessities of a regular trade. (Emphasis added) 4
This position was extended to other employees in 1968 when the
Service stated:
Suspension of employment for a period of a year or less after which the
taxpayer resumes the same employment or trade or business, will
ordinarily be considered temporary, with the result that the taxpayer will
be considered to be engaged in a trade or business in the interim.
75
The Primuth court analysis therefore seems entirely consistent with
the Service's position, and the inquiry then turns to how the change or
attempted change of employment affects the taxpayer's status of being
in a trade or business.
The deduction will depend on whether a court takes a broad or narrow
view of a taxpayer's trade or business. "A trade or business
encompasses a certain range of activities and therefore the broader the
court's view, the more the activities included. '76 This concept is
graphically illustrated in Primuth itself wherein three different opinions
are expressed as to the petitioner's trade or business: corporate official,
financial corporate official, and employee of each respective company.77
Although an all encompassing standard may be impossible to frame
and results will ultimately rely on ad hoc decision, 78 what is important is
that the taxpayer can be seeking employment while still being in a "trade
or business." 71 Once this is recognized, the question then can be handled
74. Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 60, 66.
75. Rev. Rul. 591, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 73.
76. Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigating for a Business
Investment, 14 TAX. L.R. 567, 579 (1959). Also compare the Tax Court's view and the Court of
Appeals' view in J.W. York, 29 T.C. 520 (1957), rev'd, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1955).
77. 54T.C. 374 (1970).
78. Beamsley v. Comm., 205 F.2d 743,748 (7th Cir. 1953) (different theories are "[a]s thin as the
homeophatic soup that was made by boiling the shadow of a pigeon that had been starved to
death"). See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.08 (1967); Groh,
"Trade or Business". What it Means, What it is and What it is not, 26 J. TAX. 78 (1967); For case
treatment of this question see, e.g., Benjamin Miggins, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49 (1949); Henry G.
Owen, 23 T.C. 377 (1954); M.M. Brooks, 30 T.C. 1087 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 274 F.2d 96
(9th Cir. 1959); Kaufman v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Paul C. Seguin, 36 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 1041 (1967); Furner v. Comm., 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); Don Cornish, P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-51; Yaroslaw Horodysky, 54 T.C. 490 (1970); Jeffry L. Weiler, 54 T.C. 398
(1970); Hochschild v. Comm., 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947); Albert Ravano, P-H Tax Ct. Mer.
1967-170; York v. Comm., 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958).
79. McGovern v. Comm., 42 T.C. 1148 (1964) (allowed fees paid to nurses's registry); Virginia
C. Avery, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-269 (allowed want ad costs for legal secretary).
[Vol. 1970: 468
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as would be any other business expenses without the mechanical
application of catch words or phrases."
B. Section 212
Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
(1) for the production or collection of income .... 81
It would seem that regardless of the results of the inquiry into the
taxpayer's trade or business, seeking employment would fall directly
under this section of the code. While such a result would be reached by a
literal reading of this section, subsequent history has restricted its
application to an existing right or interest thus putting it on an equal
footing with § 162.82 This position has been formalized by Treasury
Regulation § 1.212(1)(f) which specifically prohibits deducting expenses
for seeking employment under this section. Although this position has
been criticized as unwarranted," there is ample evidence to support both
sides.Y4 To base the validity of deducting expenses incurred in seeking
80. 54 T.C. 374, 379-81 (1970).
81. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 212(1).
82. Rev. Rul. 237, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 317 (motion picture investor may not deduct the cost of a
European trip to explore investments in films, because he had no existing right or interest in the
production of income); see, e.g., Eugene H. Walet, Jr., 31 T.C. 461 (1958), affd per curiam, 272
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1959); Charles R. Rhodes, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem 2270 (1964); Sturgeon v.
McMahon, 155 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl.
1970). See also Nahstoll, Non-Trade and Non-Business Expenses Deductions, 46 MiCH. L. REV.
1015 (1948); Edelmann, Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 7 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 965
(1949).
83. Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital
Investment, 14 TAX L. REV. 567, 581 (1959); see also Note, Investigation Costs; An Analysis and a
Proposal, 41 TEMP. L. REv. 81, 89-93 (1967); McDonald v. Comm., 323 U.S. 57, 65-69 (1944)
(Black, J., dissenting).
84 The foundation for the existing interest doctrine is found in McDonald v. Comm., 323 U.S.
57 (1944). In that case the petitioner, a judge, was attempting to deduct his campaign expense for re-
election. Although recognizing the business of being a judge, the Court held that the subject
expenses were incurred in trying to be a judge and "[t]he amendment of 1942 [the predecessor
of § 2121 merely enlarged the category of incomes with reference to which expenses were
deductible. It did not enlarge the range of allowable deductions of 'business' expenses. In short the
act of 1942 in no wise affected the disallowance of campaign expenses as consistently reflected by
legislative history, court decisions, Treasury practice and Treasury regulations." Id. at 62. The
Court, therefore, required all the existing restrictions applied to expenses under § 23(a)(1) [§ 162]
be applied to § 23(a)(2) [§ 212]. This would seem consistent with the reasons behind the drafting
of § 23(a)(2).
The Supreme Court three years earlier, in Higgins v. Comm., 312 U.S. 212 (1941), found the
term trade or business did not apply to a wealthy investor who personally managed his investments
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employment on a literal reading of section 212 is therefore a weak
argument. It is equally clear, however, that the explicit prohibition
against "seeking employment" expenses in the regulations under
§ 212,5 while consistent with the existing right or interest doctrine, no
way forecloses the possibility of allowing the deduction under § 162 if in
fact a trade or business is found to exist.88
C. Section 262
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall
be allowed for personal living, or family expenses.87
It has already been noted that this section is commonly used in
denying the deductibility of expenses for seeking employment. The court
in Primuth, however, refused to view all the expenses for seeking
employment as being under this broad designation, but rather looked at
from Paris and in so doing incurred expenses of maintaining an office in New York. To remedy this
§ 23(a)(2) was passed which allowed deductions for expenses paid or incurred for the production or
collection of income or for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the
production of income. (See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 74, 76 (1942), 1942-2 CuM.
BULL. 372,410, 429; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, 88 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504,
570).
The advocates of a more liberal reading call attention to the fact that had Congress only desired
to remedy Higgins it would not have gone past the allowance of deductions incurred for the
management, conservation or maintenance of property. By adding an additional allowance for
expenses incurred in producing income, it is argued that "jb]efore the 1942 Act an expense to be
deductible had to be 'ordinary and necessary' in its relation to the taxpayers business; under the new
section it need only be 'ordinary and necessary' in relationship to the taxpayer's effort to produce
income". 323 U.S. at 66, also, Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigating
for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REV. 567 (1959); also, "The bill contains a
provision which will allow taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred for the production or collection of
income whether or not such expenses are connected with the taxpayer's trade or business.
Furthermore, the amendment prevents the deduction of expenses incurred for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held by the taxpayer for the production of income." 88
CONG. REC. 6367 (1942) (remarks of Representative Disney).
Although this argument is plausible it seems to depend on the scope of the word property as used
in the statute. Therefore, it does not seem persuasive in rebutting the obvious historical
development.
The repeated judicial and governmental application of the existing right doctrine (see note 82
supra) together with Congress' passage of § 212 in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code in the same
form as § 23(a)(2), would also seem to adequately answer the above arguments.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957)
() Among expentitures not allowable as deductions under section 212 are the following: ".
expenses such as those paid or incurred in seeking employment or in placing oneself in a position to
begin rendering personal services for compensations."
86. This is borne out by the skepticism of the Primuth court to use § 212 while having no
difficulty applying § 162. 54 T.C. at 38 1.
87. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 262.
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the character of each expenditure to determine if it was a business
expense. In the Tax Court's analysis of the character of each expense, it
implicity rejected the notion that any expenditure for seeking
employment is personal. This is seen in the statement, "[a]n employment
fee by its very nature bears no relationship to personal expenses but
instead bears a direct relationship to the receipt of income." This same
idea is later explicitly stated: "Personal expenses should be limited to
those which are not acquisitive in character from an income-producing
point of view."'" Therefore, what the Primuth court has done, by its
statement that expenses for seeking employment are in no way personal,
is to impose a requirement of an in depth investigation into the nature of
each expense.
Traditionally, when courts have been confronted with expenses having
both personal and business elements, several tests were applied to
determine the deductibility of the expenses as a whole.9 Some courts
have favored what is termed the "mixed motive theory" in which the test
is one of relative weight." If the expense is primarily personal in nature;
then no deduction is available to the taxpayer. 92 This result is reached
even though the expenditure is tainted with certain "business motives".
One of the earliest cases utilizing the mixed motive test was Louis Drill"
in which the petitioner was an outside superintendent in a construction
firm. His clothing often became soiled with plaster, cement, grease, mud,
etc., and, therefore, he deducted $75 for clothing expenses." In denying
88. 54 T.C. at 381.
89. Id. at 381. See Fleisher, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigating for a
Business Investment, 14 TAX L. REv. 567, 573 n.33 (1959) [citing 4 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.91 (1954) in which it was stated, "A job seeking expenses is acquisitive and not
personally motivated; it is impelled by a taxpayer's intent to make himself an income-producing
asset."]
90. See generally I J. RABKIN & M. JOHN ON, FEDERAL INCOME, GiFr AND ESTATE TAXATION
§3 05 (1956).
91. "Tie question whether or not a transaction is carried on primarily for the production of
income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production or
collection of income, rather than primarily as a sport, hobby, or recreation, is not to be determined
solely from the intention of the taxpayer but. . . [consideration] will be given to the record of prior
gain or loss of the taxpayer in the activity, the relation between the type of activity and the principal
occupation of the taxpayer, and the uses to which the property or what it produces is put by the
taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.212-(1)(c) (1957).
92. Conversely, if the expense is predominantly "business" in nature then it has been held
deductible regardless of a "personal" nature. Nora P. Hill v. Comm., 13 T.C. 291 (1949), rev'd,
181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950) (Court of Appeals allowing summer school expenses for teacher).
93. 8 T.C. 902 (1947).
94. Petitioner also worked overtime on several occasions and deducted the cost of the meals. The
deduction was disallowed because it was held to be a personal expense. The court stated, "It is only
Vol. 1970: 468]
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the deduction, the court reasoned that clothing is about as personal as
any expenses can be.5
Expenses for personal grooming have also been held to be primarily
personal in nature and thus non-deductible. In Richard Drake" the
petitioner was an enlisted man in the army and was required to have his
hair cut more often than his personal desires dictated. The Tax Court in
denying the expenses of hair cuts reasoned that:
Expenses for personal grooming are inherently personal in nature; ....
The fact that the army may have required such grooming does not make
the expenses therefor any less personal. The evidence showed that the
Army's requirement was directed toward the maintenance by the
petitioner of a high standard of personal appearance and not toward the
accomplishments of the duties of his employment.ff
This reasoning was also employed in Sparkman v. Comm."5 in which
the taxpayer was a motion picture actor and radio performer. In order to
perfect his enunciation he bought two sets of false teeth to eliminate a
hiss. The court of appeals denied the deduction of the expenses holding
that nothing is more personal than false teeth.99
in connection with travel expenses that the statute makes specific provision for the deduction of the
cost of meals." 8 T.C. at 903. Accord, Charles Gunther 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 913, 920 (1954)
(in which the court held: ". . . individual's expenses for evening meals eaten while he is working
over-time are personal and, therefore, non-deductible under § 24(a)(1) of the 1939 Code. We
think this is so whether the individual is an employee, partner, or sole proprietor."); Richard A.
Sutter, 21 T.C. 170, 173 (1953) [... The cost of meals, entertainment, and similar items for
one's self and one's dependents, at least if not incurred while away from home in the pursuit of
one's business, see § 23(a)(1)(A), Internal Revenue Code, is ordinarily and by its very nature
personal expenditures forbidden deduction by § 24(a)(1). The presumption, no doubt
rebuttable, must accordingly arise that such costs are non-deductible. In addition to the burden
imposed by the necessity of overcoming respondent's determination we think the presumptive non-
deductibility of personal expenses may be overcome only by clear and detailed evidence as to each
instance that the expenditure in question was different from or in excess of that which would have
been made for the taxpayer's personal expense."]; James Schulz, 16 T.C. 401 (1951).
95. 8 T.C. at 903. Accord, Carrol v. Comm., 418 F.2d 91, 95 (1969) in which the court stated
"Many expenses such as . . . clothing . . . are related and even necessary to an individual's
occupation or employment, but may not be deducted under § 162(a) since they are essentially
personal expenditures." See also Betsy Luck, 30 T.C. 757 (1958); Louis M. Roth, 17 T.C. 1450,
1455 (1952); Helen Krusko Harsaghy, 2 T.C. 484 (1943); George E. Hall, Administrator, 10
B.T.A. 847 (1928). But see, Charles Hutchinson, 13 B.T.A. 1187 (1928) in which a "stunt" actor
required to provide costumes at his own expense, was allowed the cost of replacing such clothing as
an ordinary and necessary expense of his business.
96. 52 T.C. 842 (1969).
97. Id. at 844.
98. 112 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1940).
99. See Paul Bakewell, Jr. 23 T.C. 803, 805 (1955) in which the petitioner was an attorney and
used a hearing aid at all times. The court denied the deduction for the maintenance of the hearing aid
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Expenses incurred in traveling to and from one's place of business
have traditionally been held to be personal commuting expenses, and
non-deductible. In James P. Marzano'00 the petitioner, a police officer,
could have used phblic transportation free of charge to commute to and
from work. Instead, he chose to drive his own automobile claiming that
it took longer to use public transportation and that his equipment was
too bulky to carry. The court held that even though it would have been
inconvenient for the taxpayer to use public transportation, it was not an
impossibility, and thus his decision to'drive was for personal reasons and
the expenses non-deductible.''
Another test employed by the courts in the "profit v. personal
satisfaction test."'012 If the taxpayer has a profit motive, the activity may
be deductible as a business expense regardless of the amount of personal
satisfaction derived from such activity.'1 This concept is well illustrated
in Benjamin E. AdamsI' in which the petitioner decided to study art on a
full-time basis. The petitioner made no sales from 1959-1962 but he still
believed he could earn a living as an artist. The Tax Court stated that
whether activities were carried on for recreation or for pleasure is a
matter of the intention of the petitioner. In other words, the petitioner
stating: "Even if it is used in petitioner's business, in fact even if it is necessary for his successful law
practice, the device is so personal as to preclude it from being a business expense. . . . [Ihe
necessity does not overcome the personal nature .. " But see Reginald Denny, 33 B.T.A. 738
(1935) in which the petitioner, a motion picture actor, was allowed to deduct as an ordinary and
necessary expense incurred in his business the cost of dental bridge work to take the place of teeth
lost in making a prize fight picture.
100. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-159.
101. But, e.g., Rev. Rul. 100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34; James A. Kistler, 40 T.C. 657 (1963);
Cases in support of nondeductibility of commuting expenses are: Margaret Galotta Sheldon, 50
T C. 24 (1968); Lenke Marot, 36 T.C. 238 (1961); Frank H. Sullivan, I B.T.A. 93 (1924); Mort L.
Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927); Charles H. Sachs, 6 B.T.A. 68 (1927); Abraham W. Ast, 9 B.T.A.
694 (1927); Charles Crowther, 28 T.C. 1293 (1957), rev'd, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959). It must be
recognized that the courts draw a distinction between expenses of traveling incurred in carrying on a
trade or business and commuting expenses. William L. Heuer, Jr., 32 T.C. 947 (1959), affd per
curam, 283 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 5, 1960); Bruton v. Comm., 9 T.C. 882 (1947).
102 1 J RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GiFr & ESTATE TAXATION § 3.05 (1970).
103. But where the activity is carried on for personal satisfaction and prestige, without
substantial prospect of profit, it is not deductible as a business expense. I J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON,
FEDERAL INCONW, GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 3.05 (1970). In Rev. Rul. 55-291, the taxpayer was a
president of a corporation engaged in the food and chemical processing industry. He was appointed
as lecturer on food technology at X college at a salary of $1.00 per year. The court denied the
deduction for the expense incurred for material used in the lectures, radio, T.V. appearances, etc.,
stating that the expenses were personal for the sole purpose of increasing prestige and establishing
his professional reputation. Rev. Rul. 291, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 317.
104. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1390 (1966).
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must have a "profit motive." 10e Because the taxpayer was not a wealthy
man who can afford to indulge in a full-time hobby and because he
gave up the idea of becoming an artist for another job, the court allowed
the deduction as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a
business. 106
The courts have considered several factors in determining whether the
activity of the petitioner is a hobby from which he derives personal
satisfaction, or whether the petitioner has a profit motive. In Lincoln A.
Bolt, 107 the Tax Court considered such factors as the time devoted by the
petitioner to the activity, whether accurate records were kept of
expenditures and income, whether the activity was operated in a
business-like manner and whether the petitioner had a profit motive. The
court, in allowing the deduction, concluded that petitioner, having
satisfied these conditions, sufficiently came within the framework of an
existing "trade or business".
The taxpayer in Myron E. Cherry'10 bought equipment to make a race
track timing device. The Tax Court held the taxpayer did not have a
bonafide expectation of realizing a profit because he never advertised or
held himself out to be in business, because there was no evidence that he
had filed an actual patent application, and because he made no effort to
market, sell or manufacture the device. 109
105. Id. at 1391. Accord, American Properties Inc., 28 T.C. 1100 (1957), affdper curiam, 262
F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958) ("It has been held that whether an enterprise is conducted as a business for
profit is a matter of intention and good faith, and all the facts in a particular case are to be
considered.. . . Intention is a question of fact to be determined not only from the direct testimony
as to intent, but from a consideration of all the evidence, including the conduct of the parties.")
Charles A. Dun Leavay, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 944 (1965) in which the court found that the
petitioner did not expect to realize a profit and denied the deduction; Henry L. Sutherland, 35 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 926 (1966) in which the court was unable to ascertain with certainty the motive of the
petitioners and therefore denied the deduction.
106. Benjamin E. Adams, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1392 (1966). Accord, Charles D. Eggert, 26 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 854 (1957); Sebastian De Grazia, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1742 (1962); American
Properties Inc., 28 T.C. 1100 (1957), affdper curiam, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958).
107. 50 T.C. 1007 (1968).
108. 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1967).
109. Id. at 608. Accord, James A. Warren, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1037 (1968), in which the court
held the petitioner lacked the profit motive necessary. The court held the petitioner's real and
dominant motive was purely persbnal; Marcell N. Rand, 34 T.C. 1146 (1960) held the expenses for
maintenance of yacht were not deductible because the yacht was primarily for pleasure rather than
for production of income. The petitioner claimed he had chartered out the yacht as an income
producing venture. The court stated there was no definite abandonment from holding for his
personal use to a holding for income procuding purposes; Robert Lee Henry, 36 T.C. 879 (1961)
involved a tax specialist, who for health reasons was forced to give up riding for boating. The court
denied the deduction for the maintenance of the yacht because he had not shown that he was not
substituting one personal interest or sport for another. He had also failed to offer a single example
of a client derived from the boating contact.
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It must be emphasized that a profit motive alone does not make the
expenditure fall within the framework of "trade or business". This is
illustrated in Kerns Wright"0 in which the taxpayer was a lawyer by
profession. He and his wife decided to travel around the world and write
a book about the trip with the intent to make a profit from the book
sales. The Tax Court denied the deduction stating that "To allow the
deduction of such expenditures to two people who have never been
engaged in the business of writing and have no intention of attempting to
earn a livelihood in the future in such business would be an invitation to
many taxpayers to convert pleasure trips into business trips at the
expense of the revenue.""' The court also concluded that engaging in an
activity with the hope of making a profit does not mean that one is
engaged in a trade or business.
Another test, not actually applied by the courts but which has been
employed as a taxpayer's argument, is the "but for" test."' Although
this test is not accepted by the courts, the taxpayer would argue that
"but for" his engaging in a "trade or business" the expenses would not
have been incurred.
The taxpayer in Ronald D. Kroll13 proposed this argument but the
Tax Court held that it was not sufficient to allow a deduction. It must be
determined that the nature of the expenses is not personal or of a
deductible nature."4
The test which affords the most logical and rational result is that of
allocation. When the expense is a combination of "personal" and
"business" elements, the courts allow as a deduction only that portion
of the expense which is "business" in nature." 5
As indicated in the above discussion, courts have traditionally looked
to the intent or subjective motivations of the taxpayer to determine what
portion of the expense is personal as opposed to business. It is at this
point the court could allocate the deductibility of the expense. Primuth
on the other hand foreclosed the use of any of these tests because the
110. 31T.C. 1264(1959).
11. Id at 1268.
112 See Kilbourn, Deductible Expenses: Transactions Entered into for Profit; Income
Producing Property. 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 193, 200 (1963).
113. 49 T.C. 557 (1968).
114. Id. at 567. Accord Don Page, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-112; Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A.
1038 (1939). affd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
115 Accord, Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52; Manu-Mine Research and Development
Company, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1382 (1967); Karl Schmitt 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1967);
Henry G. Wilton, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1815 (1965).
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court refused to recognize any mixture of business and personal
elements. It merely concluded that there was no personal element in an
employment fee. In reaching this conclusion, the court has adopted an
objective test."' The court merely looks at the nature of the expenses and
concludes that they were "business" oriented regardless of the reasons
for which they were incurred. It completely refuses to recognize that the
expenses were incurred because Primuth was personally dissatisfied with
his old employment. This holding is doubly important, however, for not
only did the court refuse to allow the petitoner's personal motivation to
impute a personal element to the expense, but it also refused to allow the
fact of seeking employment to impute a personal element either. Thus
the Service's position that expenses incurred in seeking employment are
personal now has doubtful validity.
An explicit enunciation of why expenses incurred in seeking
employment are personal has not been set forth by the Commissioner.
These expenses have, however, been likened to good will and
116. Prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, § 217 enacted in 1964 was intended to apply only to
those who were employed by others. The basis for this exclusion of the self-employed person was
that in self-employment there is no possibility of transfer and moves are made purely for personal
reasons. This idea embodies the objective motivational theory. Subsequent to the 1969 Tax Reform
Act, the self-eniployed individual was included within the scope of § 217. Thus, in the moving
expense area, the court has proceeded from the subjective test to an objective test. P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1970-262.
The subjective motivational approach was also applied in determining the deductibility of
educational expenses prior to the issuance of a revised regulation. Tres. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967)
provides:
Qualification for new trade or business. (i) The second category of non-deductible
educational expenses within the scope of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph are expenditures
made by an individual for education which is part of a program of study being pursued by
him which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business. In the case of an employee,
a change of duties does not constitute a new trade of business if the new duties involve the
same general type of work as is involved in the individual's present employment. For this
purpose, all teaching and related duties shall be considered to involve the same general type
of work. The following are examples of changes in duties which do not constitute new trades
or business:
(a) Elementary to second school classroom teacher.
(b) Classroom teacher in one subject (such as mathematics) to classroom teacher in another
subject (such as science).
(c) Classroom teacher to guidance counselor.
(d) Classroom teacher to principal.
Since the issuance of this regulation, the court has employed an objective standard in determining
the deductibility of educational expenses. Under the objective standard, the taxpayer is not allowed
a deduction if his program of study will qualify him for a new trade or business. See Jeffrey L.
Weiler, 54 T.C. 398 (1970); Ben (Bong) H. Kim, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1969-126; Ronald F.
Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969).
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investigating costs. 117 As such they have been held not proximately
related to the taxpayer's trade or business. This position is supportable if
a limited definition is afforded an employee's trade or business. Once the
definition is expanded, activities directed at seeking new employment
may easily fall within the newly recognized trade or business. Under a
117 One of the most perplexing problems in tax law is determining whether an expenditure is
currently deductible or whether it must be capitalized as a long-term investment. The test usually
accepted is whether the item is attributable to the current operation of the taxpayer, or whether it
represents an investment in future profits. I J. RADKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND
ESTATE TAXATION § 3.08 (Supp. 1970). At this point it must be said that a capital expenditure is an
outlay of capital that results in the acquisition of property or permanently improves its value.
Capital expenditures are not deductible as expenses. 2 PRENTICE-HALL, FEDERAL TAXES 16,681
(Supp 1970). Thus, an argument can be made that expenses for seeking employment are capital in
nature and therefore non-deductible, since the benefit derived will exceed one year in duration.
Another aspect of this argument views expenses as good will and therefore non deductible. Although
good will is a capital asset [INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 12211 the difficulty is in defining good will.
The Supreme Court defined good will in Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 522 (1888):
every positive advantage that has been acquired by the old firm in the progress of its
business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried
on or with the name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of
the business.
Good will has also been defined in 2 STORY, PARTNERSHIPS § 99 (6th ed. 1968) as:
Good will may be properly enough described to be the advantage or benefit, which is
acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property
employed therein; in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which
it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill, or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental
circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.
Despite the difficulties in defining good will, it is generally recognized that good will is an intangible
asset existing in addition to other specific assets to which it may relate. 3B J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOmE TAX § 22.50 (J. Malone ed. 1966). See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d
Cir. 1945); Rev. Rul. 70, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 370; United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.
1%3); Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Comm., 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962); Ray H. Schulz, 34 T.C.
235, affd 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961); Metropolitan Laundry Co., Ltd. v. United States, 100 F.
Supp 803 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Strauss v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. La. 1961); J.C.
Cornillie Co. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Ernest B. White, 32 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 80 (1%3); The Hillside Dairy Company, 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 193 (1944); Los Angeles
Towel Service Co., 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 737 (1949). The Primuth court discards this argument by
merely stating that "the expense was not related to a purchase or sale of a capital asset." 54 T.C. at
380.
The presence of goodwill in a business usually depends on the earning power of the business which
is reflected in the income the business is able to produce. 3B J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAX § 22.50 (Q. Malone ed. 1966). It has been held that goodwill cannot exist without a going
business to which it is incident. Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Company, 149 U.S. 436,
(1893); Morris Gumpel, Executor, 2 B.T.A. 1127 (1925); William M. Wailes, 25 B.T.A. 278 (1932);
Burke v. Canfield, 121 F.2d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1941). But it is not necessarily true that the
goodwill of a business cannot be transferred apart from any tangible assets. 3B J. MERTENS, LAW
oF FEDERAL INcoMsE TAXATION § 22.50 (J. Malone ed. 1966); Falstaff Beer, Inc. v. Comm., 322
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1963); Bird & Son, Inc. v. White, 16 F. Supp. 168 (D.C. Mass. 1936), Peveley
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liberal definition it is not enough, therefore, to rely on a lack of
proximity to explain the personal nature of the expenses. If the Tax
Court also refuses to allow the self-serving motives of the taxpayer to
impute a personal nature to the expenses, there seems no foundation at
all for the Service's position. This is not to say that expenses incurred in
seeking employment can not be personal. The answer will depend,
however, on the specific expense or expenses the taxpayer attempts to
deduct rather than on the Service's categorization.
IV. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
The effect of this new approach to analyzing expenses incurred in
seeking employment can best be demonstrated by applying it to several
hypotheticals.
As has been shown, the Primuth court uses a two step analysis. First,
the extent of the activities is examined to determine whether there is an
existing trade or business (or an existing right or interest) and then,
secondly, the expenses are examined to determine whether they are
ordinary and necessary and in fact business in nature.
A. Taxpayer Regularly Employed in an Established Trade or Business
Who Either Loses his Present Position or Seeks a Change in
Employment.
1. A, an engineer, becomes dissatisfied with his present employment and
engages an employment agency to find him a new position on a contingent
fee basis. The agency is successful and A accepts new employment as an
engineer requiring the same duties with Company X.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-A's expenses came within Rev. Rul. 60-223 and were,
therefore, deductible.
AFTER PRIMUTH-A's expenses are incurred in the trade or business of
being an engineer and by their character are business in nature and,
therefore, also deductible.
2. A, an engineer, becomes dissatisfied with his present employment and
Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925). It has been held that if the price is greater than the worth of the
tangible asset, it is assumed that good will was also purchased. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 23 B.T.A. 815
(1931); Herbert Brush Mfg. Co., 15 B.T.A. 673 (1929); American Seating Co., 14 B.T.A. 328, affd
on this issue. 50 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1931); Union Nat'l Bank, 18 B.T.A. 468 (1929); Arthur P.
Williams, 24 B.T.A. 1070 (1931); Greene & Greene, I l B.T.A. 643 (1928).
A contract of employment with an individual for his skill, acquaintance and experience is not a
purchase of goodwill. 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.40 (J. Malone ed.
1968); see also Oppenheim's Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Mich., 1950); Providence Mill
Supply Co., 2 B.T.A. 791 (1925); Black River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A. 490 (1929); Floyd D. Arkers,
6 T.C. 693 (1946).
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engages an employment agency to find him a new position on a contingent
fee basis. The agency is successful and A accepts new employment with an
increase in pay and a promotion (although still in the engineering field).
BEFORE PRIMUTH-again the expenses were allowable under Rev. Rul. 60-
223,
AFTER PRIMUTH-the change of duties does not foreclose the possibility of
remaining in the same trade or business; therefore, as in number 1, the
expenses would be deductible."'
3. Same facts as 1 and 2 but the employment agency contract is on a non-
contingent fee basis.
BEFORE PRiMuTH-arguably, since the fees are to be paid regardless of the
securing of a new position, the expenses do not fall literally under Rev.
Rul. 60-223, and, therefore, would not be deductible.
AMR PRIMUTH-since the expenses are incurred in an existing trade or
business and are purely business in nature, the fees would be deductible.
4. Same facts as 1 and 3 but the employment agency is unsuccessful in
obtaining new employment.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-the expenses are clearly for seeking employment and
non-deductible.
AFTER PRIMUTH-using the same rationale as in 3, the fees would be
deductible.
5. A, an engineer, becomes dissatisfied with his present employment and
incurs expenses on his own to obtain a new position. A is successful in
obtaining employment as an engineer with Company X.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-the expenses are not paid to an employment agency
and do not fall under Rev. Rul. 60-223; therefore, non-deductible.
AFTER PRIMUTH-since incurred in an existing trade or business, the
deductibility would depend on the nature of the expense. The court's
decision in Gerhard indicates the expenses would probably be deductible.
6. A, an engineer, becomes dissatisfied with his present employment and
incurs expenses on his own to obtain a new position. Unlike 5, A is
unsuccessful.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-the expenses are clearly non-deductible as expenses
incurred in seeking employment.
118. David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970); Guy Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970); Kenneth Kenfield,
54 T C 1197 (1970); W. Richard Gerhard, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-262.
This view is also consistent with the treatment of education expenses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
5(b)(3) (1967) which provides: "In the case of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a
new trade or business if the new duties involve the same general type of work as involved in the
individual's present employment."
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AFTER PRI MUTH -although the taxpayer in Gerhard actually secured
employment, it would seem once the court has allowed expenses to be
deducted, the same rationale that ended the distinction between "fees paid
in securing" and "fees paid in seeking" would apply in this instance.
Therefore, A's expenses are arguably deductible regardless of his success
in attaining a new position.
B. Taxpayer Entering a Trade or Business
1. A, a recent law school graduate, after passing the bar exam, engages an
employment agency to find him a job. The agency is successful and A
accepts a new position with X law firm.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-A's expenses (provided the fees are paid on a
contingent basis) were covered under Rev. Rul. 60-223 and therefore
deductible.
AFTER PRIMUTH-the result would depend upon the determination of
when A's trade or business of being a lawyer began. If A is considered to
be a lawyer upon passing the bar exam the expenses would be deductible;
if not, the result is then questionable. So long as Rev. Rul. 60-223 is in
effect, however, even if the expenses do not come within the Primuth
requirements, the expenses would be deductible.
2. A, a recent law school graduate, after passing the bar exam engages an
employment agency to find him a job. The agency is successful and A
accepts a position with X Company (not requiring legal duties).
BEFORE PRIMUTH-the expenses would be deductible under Rev. Rul. 60-
223.
AFTER PRIMUTH-unless the rationale of applying fees paid in securing
employment to the taxpayer's new trade or business is used, it would be
difficult to allow the deduction under the Primuth requirement. As in 1,
however, the expenses might still be deductible depending on the status of
Rev. Rul. 60-223.
3. A is discharged from the military service in July, 1970, and incurs
expenses to obtain employment (employment agency fees and individual
expenses). A obtains employment in March 1971 as a salesman with X
company. A, in his 1970 income tax return, attempts to deduct expenses
incurred in seeking employment during July-December of 1970.
BEFORE PRIMUTH-A's expenses are for seeking employment and not
deductible.
AFMR PRIMUTH-A's expenses would also probably not be deductible.
The reason, however, is that even though they are business in nature they
are not incurred in an existing trade or business.
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V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Primuth, courts restrictively viewed an employee's trade or
business. The employee's trade or business was defined in relation to the
employer's activities; therefore, the trade or business terminated when
the employment relationship ended. This restrictive view comple-
mented the Service's position that expenses incurred in seeking employ-
ment were personal.
The Primuth court, by viewing the employee's trade or business in
relation to the employee's activities, gave an independent business status
to the employee."' In so doing, it also recognized the possibility of
seeking employment within a trade or business. This position forced the
court to then analyze the expenses involved as it would any other
expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
Although this presents a rational approach to the controversy, it is
still possible that the court would balk at giving blanket approval to all
employment seeking expenses. The requirement of actually obtaining a
position would serve as a clear indication that the expenses were in fact
business in nature.' This requirement would be for administrative
convenience, however, and should be recognized as such.
It would seem that an inquiry into the actual expenses would provide a
means of determining if they were of a business nature. Certain expenses
(employment agency fees, resumes, etc.) are pure business expenses. 2 1
Other expenses such as transportation, lodging, meals, etc. would
present a more difficult problem, but the problem is not a new one and
has been before the court numerous times. In the words of Judge
Tannenwald in his concurring opinion to Primuth:
I am not concerned that such a test will open up a Pandora's box of
unjustified deductions. The courts are not wanting in capability of
separating the wheat from chaff and, at the same time, exhibiting
sufficient flexibility not to proliferate taxpayers' difficulties unnecessarily.
Such a task is simply a normal attribute of judicial life.1"
119. Maurice Artstein, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1970-220.
120. A similar position is taken in the field of investigation expenses by requiring actual entry
into a business and later abandonment (Rev. Rul. 418, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 143).
121. 54 T.C. at 379.
122. ld. at 382.
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